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Abstract 
Substantial political power is often attributed to interest groups. The origin of this power 
is not quite clear, though, and the mechanisms by which influence is effectuated are not yet 
fully understood. The last two decades  have yielded a  vast number of studies which use 
empirical models to  assess  the importance of interest groups for the formation of public 
policy. Each of these studies yields insights on particular, confined aspects of interest group 
politics. To get  a  more complete picture of the  results,  however,  a  broad  survey of the 
literature seems useful. It is the purpose of this paper to provide such a survey. 
JEL classification: D72; D78 
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1. Introduction 
It can almost be considered a truism, that interest groups play an important role 
in  the  formation  of  public  policy.  Repeated  accounts  for  this  can  be  found  in 
economics  and  political  science  literature,  but  also  in journalistic  accounts  and 
among policy-makers. Following the  early work of Bentley (1908),  it was  in the 
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fifties  that  contributions from  scholars  like  Truman (1951),  Dahl  (1956),  and 
Schattschneider  (1960),  placed  interest  groups  at  the  heart  of  the  (American) 
political process. Sometimes the role of interest groups as an intermediary between 
citizens and government is met with approval, more often there is concern about 
the  negative impact of interest groups  on the  democratic quality of government 
and on economic indicators like growth, inflation and unemployment. Arguments 
pro and con the  various conceptions of  'interest groups politics' have long been 
based on theoretical reasoning, anecdotal evidence and casual empirics. Only in 
the  seventies, quantitative historical records  in combination with  more  rigorous 
econometric tools started to get more widely used. Since then there has been a vast 
literature,  using empirical models  to  assess  the  influence of  interest groups  on 
public  policy-making. These  studies  typically  give  insight  on  certain  confined 
aspects of interest group politics. To get a  more complete picture, a  survey of the 
results obtained thus far seems  useful. The present paper intends to  give such a 
survey. 
Our basic selection criterion has been that a study uses quantitative data and an 
empirical model  to  address  the  'how  and  when'  of interest group  influence on 
public policy. 1 By  taking such  a  broad (methodological) perspective,  we  loose 
much of the details and nuance of the individual studies, on both the conceptual, 
theoretical  and  methodological  level. 2  For  instance,  some  studies  deal  with 
organized  interests,  others  with  unorganized groups  merely  characterized  by  a 
common  interest.  Some  authors  derive  hypotheses  from  underlying theoretical 
models, others simply refer to common sense arguments. Some use Ordinary Least 
Squares,  others  employ  more  refined estimation techniques.  The  differences  in 
approach  are  often  subtle  and  sometimes  important,  but  we  refrain  from  fully 
spelling these out.  As a  consequence, we will have to be somewhat vague in the 
use of notions like interest group, influence, and public policy. We choose to paint 
a  rough,  stylized picture, rather than being very precise (and painstakingly long) 
everywhere or selecting a carefully defined subfield that leaves out much material 
that is closely related. 3 
In the overview we  want to focus on the  studies that explicitly relate interest 
1  By using this criterion,  we do not mean to imply that no insight can be obtained  through in-depth 
case-study or systematic survey. For an excellent survey study see Schlozman  and Tierney (1986). 
2 There already are some useful surveys of the literature on interest groups. Mitchell and Munger 
(1991) review different schools of thought in the economics literature, Morton and Cameron (1992) 
give a detailed account of the theoretical models of campaign contributions,  and Potters and Van 
Winden (1995) more generally review different theoretical approaches to the influence production 
process. 
3 For surveys with a more restricted scope see Noll (1989) who gives a detailed assessment of the 
'interest group' versus the 'public interest' theory of regulation,  and Swinnen  and Van der Zee (1993) 
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group  variables  to  public  policy  variables.  Therefore,  we  put  ourselves  some 
restrictions in the selection of papers and issues to be included.  Firstly, we do not 
review  studies  that  exclusively  focus  on  collective  action  and  interest  group 
formation.  These  issues  are  addressed  only  if  there  is  a  direct  link  to  public 
policy-making. Secondly, we focus on the explanation of public policy and leave 
aside  studies  that  relate  interest  groups  to  other  variables,  like  public  opinion, 
economic  growth  or inflation.  Thirdly,  we  refrain  from  summarizing  normative 
assessments  of the impact of interest groups.  Some authors interpret their empiri- 
cal findings as indicating that the role played by interest groups is good or bad, but 
we  will  be  concentrating  on  the  'bare  facts'.  For  one  thing,  similar  empirical 
findings are often given quite opposite normative evaluations. 
For the  presentation  of the  material,  we choose a  relatively  'clean'  setup.  A 
distinction  is  made between  activities  of interest  groups and  structural  character- 
istics  of interest  groups.  The  results  of both  types  of variables,  as  explanatory 
variables for public policy, will be discussed in turn. 4 However, we will not give 
a historical ordering of the material, nor will we make subdivisions along different 
lines  or  schools  of thought.  We  want  to  give  a  quick  and  efficient  overview, 
concentrating  on  the  empirical  results  as  much  as  possible.  Which  issues  have 
been  much  studied,  which  have  been  largely  neglected?  What  type  of data  are 
typically being used? Where does the evidence point in one direction, where is  it 
more equivocal? What are the main problems of empirical  inquiry,  and what are 
the perspectives for future research? It is at these questions that the survey focuses. 
The  organization  of  the  paper  is  as  follows.  In  Section  2  we  review  the 
empirical  results  on  the  impact  of the  activities  and  characteristics  of interest 
groups on political  decision-making.  Section 3  discusses  these results  in a  some- 
what  broader  perspective  and  provides  some  suggestions  for  further  research. 
Finally,  Section 4  gives a  summary of our main findings. 
2. Interest groups. Activities,  characteristics  and influence 
This  section  gives  a  broad  review  of empirical  studies  that  try  to  assess  the 
influence  of interest  groups  on  political  decision-making.  To  that  purpose,  it  is 
useful to first give some idea of the dependent variables that are typically used in 
the models to be reviewed. To assess influence, generally, an equation is estimated 
in which the dependent variable represents  a decision variable of the public sector 
4 Roughly, the distinction runs parallel to the difference between structural form and reduced form 
estimation. In the  former case, endogenous political decision variables are  related to endogenous 
(decision) variables of interest groups. In the latter case, endogenous political decision variables are 
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which  the  interest  group  is  hypothesized  to  influence.  Roughly,  two  sets  of 
dependent  variables  can  be  distinguished.  One  set  concerns  the  behavior  of 
individual political decision-makers. The second set relates to policy outcomes. 
The empirical analysis of individual political decision-makers focuses predomi- 
nantly on roll call voting by members of the U.S.  Congress. Occasionally, voting 
in  committees is  considered,  and  only very rarely  other,  non-voting activities  of 
individual  legislators  are  analyzed. 5  Typically,  the  legislator-directed  studies 
focus  on  one  vote  issue  or  a  set  of related  issues.  Popular  issues  for empirical 
inquiry are labor related  issues  and issues concerning industry specific regulation 
(like  price  supports,  protective  regulation,  licensing  etc.).  A  final  feature  is  that, 
typically,  cross-section  data  are  used  to  compare  voting  by different  legislators. 
Only  rarely  time  series  data  are  used  to  analyze  changing  vote  patterns  of 
individual  legislators.  6 
The  studies  that  focus  on  policy  outcomes  investigate  the  extent  to  which 
interest groups have influenced the ultimate outcome of the political decision-mak- 
ing  process.  The  kind  of policy  variables  investigated  is  quite  diverse,  ranging 
from state  outlays  on  agricultural  research  to  total  federal  government  expendi- 
tures,  and  from the  restrictions  on  trucking  weights  to  regulated  sugar  prices.  7 
Again,  cross-sectional  data  are  more often  used  than  time  series.  The  American 
situation, with a substantial number of states and significant policy freedom for the 
states,  provides  an  excellent  opportunity to  use  data  of inter-state  differences  of 
both  policy  variables  and  interest  group  characteristics.  Compared  to  data  from 
samples across countries or across industries, inter-state data have the advantage of 
a  relatively  high  degree  of  comparability.  Data  on  inter-state  differences  in 
occupational  and  industrial  regulation  as  well  as  social  transfers  have  been 
particularly popular for empirical testing. Cross-country and cross-industry studies, 
on the other hand,  mainly deal  with protection and tax policies. 
Both sets  of endogenous  variables  are  important  and  useful  for the  empirical 
assessment  of interest  group  influence.  Proponents  of strict  methodological indi- 
vidualism  probably  prefer  the  use  of  data  on  individual  policy-makers.  And, 
indeed,  when policy outcome variables  are used,  the complicated issue of how to 
derive  the  aggregate  policy  outcome  from  decisions  by  individual  legislators  is 
usually  not  addressed.  But  even  if  interest  groups  influence  the  actions  of 
individual  politicians,  it  is  still  an  important  question  whether  this  influence  is 
detectable  in the  ultimate  outcome of the political process.  Moreover, even if the 
influence  on  individual  politicians  is  hardly  detectable  in  the  data,  it  is  still 
5 See Schroedel (1986) and Wright (1990), and Hall and Wayman (1990), respectively. 
~' See e.g. Bronars and Lott (1994) and Grenzke (1989a). 
7 See Esty and Caves (1983) for a study where a set of issues is combined and weighed according to 
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possible  that  many  small  influences  add  up  to  a  significant  influence  on  the 
aggregate policy outcome. Influencing individual political actors is just a derived 
goal  for  interest  groups.  Ultimately  they  are  interested  in  the  outcomes  of the 
policy process. The use of policy variables may also be useful when it is not clear 
which activity of a legislator is being influenced by the interest group. Apart from 
roll  call  voting,  activities  like  lobbying  among  other  congressmen,  formulating 
amendments and shaping the details of bills, are crucial for determining legislative 
outcomes.  Data  on  these  activities  are  hard  to  come  by,  but  interest  group 
influence on these activities might be detectable in the aggregate policy outcomes. 
In the sequel,  we discuss various types of interest group related variables that 
have been tested on their capacity to explain political decision-making variables. A 
distinction  is  made  between  results  that  directly  relate  influence  to  political 
activities  of  interest  groups  (Section  2.1),  and  those  that  relate  influence  to 
structural  and  environmental  characteristics  of  interest  groups  (Section  2.2). 
Contrary  to  the  observable political  activities,  like  lobbying and  contributing  to 
campaigns, the  structural  and environmental characteristics of interest groups are 
usually  not  legislator-specific.  Therefore,  the  distinction  between  activities  and 
characteristics largely runs parallel to the use of data on individual legislators and 
the  use  of  data  on  policy  outcomes,  respectively.  Section  2.3  summarizes  the 
results. 
2.1.  Political activities of interest groups 
What do interest groups do to influence governmental policy? A comprehensive 
list  would  include:  influencing  and mobilizing the  electorate,  financing  electoral 
campaigns, lobbying congress and the executive branch, and going to court. Much 
has  been  said  and  written  about  the  use  and  relative  success  of each  of these 
techniques  on the basis of more or less detailed  case studies,  but relatively few 
conclusions  have been based on  systematic and  rigorous  empirical  inquiry.  The 
single  most  systematically  studied  activity  of interest  groups  is  contributing  to 
election campaigns. This, of course, is not surprising. Campaign contributions are 
easily  quantifiable  and  data  on  both  source  and  target  are  readily  available. 
However,  as  will  be  seen,  the  evidence  concerning  the  impact  of  campaign 
contributions  on politicians'  behavior is  fairly equivocal.  The fact that there  are 
different contribution  strategies may be part of the  explanation of these  (mixed) 
results.  These  strategies  will  be discussed  in  the  second part of this  subsection. 
Thereafter,  the  empirical evidence regarding  the  impact of activities,  other  than 
contributing  to  campaigns,  will  be  reviewed.  Material  is  more  scarce  here,  but 
there are some interesting results concerning  'lobbying'. 
2.1.1.  Campaign  contributions 
The empirical research is inspired by early theoretical papers on the investment 
approach to  campaign contributions  (Bental  and  Ben-Zion,  1975;  Ben-Zion  and 408  J. Potters, R. Sloof  / European Journal of Political Economy 12 (1996) 403-442 
Eytan,  1974;  Welch,  1974).  8 In this approach campaign contributions are envis- 
aged as explicit investments to obtain favorable policy. Politicians are willing to 
serve  an  interest  group's  wishes  (to  a  certain  extent),  and  thereby  willing  to 
deviate from the policy position preferred by the voters (or themselves), because 
money is valuable in attracting votes. These theoretical models thus predict that 
campaign contributions have a discernible influence on public policy. 
Empirical studies that try to determine the impact of campaign contributions on 
public policy typically address the question whether money -  mainly donated by 
political action committees (PACs) -  can buy a legislator's vote. Sometimes the 
influence of the mere act of contributing is studied, but usually the impact of the 
level of contributions on  voting behavior is  investigated.  The question  whether 
money  directly influences  roll  call  voting  behavior  of individual  legislators  is 
subject to extensive debate. The empirical evidence is fairly mixed. Some authors 
find that contributions do have significant and sometimes substantial influence on 
voting behavior, whereas others find moneyed influence to be moderate or even 
non-existing. 9 It does not seem useful to give an extensive presentation of the 
different studies, methods and results, but a representative sample may be insight- 
ful. 
Silberman and Durden (1976) is one of the earliest studies that investigates the 
impact of campaign contributions. They find that total campaign contributions of 
organized labor do have significant influence on a representative's voting behavior 
concerning  a  minimum  wage  issue.  Contributions  from  an  opposing  business 
group, interested to forestall increasing labor costs, also appeared to be significant 
but less influential. An omission of the study, however, is that it did not control 
for the legislator's party affiliation and thus was likely to overestimate the impact 
of contributions if PACs  give along partisan  lines (cf. Frendreis and Waterman, 
1985).  A usual practice is to evaluate the impact of the labor (or business) share of 
total  contributions  on  voting.  Significant effects of this  share  on  various  vote 
issues  have been reported, even when  it is  controlled for party affiliation (e.g., 
Coughlin,  1985,  McArthur and Marks,  1988,  Peltzman,  1984). 
Evidence for a limited impact of contributions on roll call voting is provided by 
Wright  (1985).  He  examines  five PACs  of national  associations  which,  though 
8 An overview of the theoretical economics literature on interest groups is beyond the scope of this 
paper. For an overview along historical lines, and a discussion of the theoretical origins of much of the 
empirical research reviewed here, see Mitchell and Munger (1991). 
9 Studies belonging to the first group are, among others, Chappell (198 l a), Coughlin (1985), Durden 
et al. (1991),  Fort et al. (1993),  Frendreis and Waterman (1985),  Kau et al. (1982),  Kau and Rubin 
(1981,  1993),  McArthur and Marks (1988), Masters and Zardkoohi (1988), Peltzman (1984), Saltzman 
(1987),  Silberman and Durden (1976),  Stratmann (1991,  1992b,1995a),  and Wilhite and Theilmann 
(1987).  Studies that find support for only moderate influence include Abler (1991),  Bronars and Lott 
(1994), Chappell (1982),  Grenzke (1989a),  Langbein (1993),  Wayman (1985),  Welch (1982),  Wilhite 
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judged to belong to the set of most influential PACs, were not able to change the 
voting  outcome  on  any  specific  bill.  Grenzke  (1989a)  investigates  some  120 
PACs,  affiliated with  10 major organizations, and finds that contributions do not 
generally  affect  House  members'  voting  patterns.  Langbein  (1993)  studies  a 
specific ideological issue, i.c.  gun control, and finds that contributions from both 
proponents  and  opponents  did  not  convert  a  legislator's  opinion.  The  limited 
influence of contributions from ideological PACs on votes which are ideological 
in nature (e.g. abortion, homosexuality, nuclear weapons) is confirmed by Kau and 
Rubin (1993). 
The ambiguity of results is not restricted to roll call voting. Though the number 
of studies is limited here,  also committee voting and legislative involvement give 
mixed results. For instance, Wright (1990) investigates voting on two issues in the 
Agricultural  and  the  Ways  and  Means  committee,  and  finds  little  influence  of 
contributions.  Contrarily, Schroedel (1986) finds some evidence for the impact of 
contributions  on  committee  voting.  Hall  and  Wayman  (1990)  hypothesize  that 
PAC money is allocated to mobilize legislative support and demobilize opposition, 
rather  than  buying  votes.  The  goal  of  campaign  contributions  is  to  provide 
incentives for supporters to act as agents on the principals' behalf. They investi- 
gate  participation  of committee members on  a  specific  issue  for three  different 
committees  and  find  strong  support  for  the  mobilization  hypothesis,  but  no 
evidence for the demobilization hypothesis. 
To explain the equivocality of results, several considerations come up. Most of 
these relate to the type of vote issue, the type of legislator, and the type of interest 
group  under  study.  Firstly,  PAC  influence  is  likely  to  vary with  the  scope  and 
visibility (salience) of the vote issue. Issues which are not of general interest might 
be more easily affected. For example, the  significant effect found by Stratmann 
(1991,  1995a)  is based on a  study of votes on subsidies (through price supports 
and  quotas)  to  the  farming  sector.  The  issue  has  a  narrow  focus,  benefits  are 
concentrated  and  costs  are  distributed  widely.  Relatedly,  special  interest  groups 
can  be expected to be more  effective when  their  goals  and  actions  receive less 
public  attention.  Jones  and  Kaiser  (1987)  indeed  find  that  under  low  media 
coverage money from union  approved PACs  was  more important than  ideology 
and  party  affiliation  in  explaining  pro-labor voting,  whereas  for highly  covered 
issues  the  roles  are  reversed.  Also  in  Schroedel  (1986)  contributions  appear to 
have a larger effect when there is low public visibility. 
Moreover,  it can be  argued  that  the  analysis of a  specific bill  or a  series  of 
individual  bills  might  be  too  narrow  to  get  an  accurate  reflection  of  interest 
groups'  influence.  Not  only  might  the  single  issue  be unrepresentative,  interest 
groups are often interested in a variety of votes and buy access to support lobbying 
activities instead of votes. Hence, a  series of bills should be analyzed as a group 
instead of analyzing bills as single issues to get an idea of the overall influence of 
interest groups on Congress. Indeed, the Wilhite and Theilmann (1987)  examina- 
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voting  on  labor  legislation  in  general  (but  see  Bronars  and  Lott  (1994)  for  a 
conclusion to the contrary). 
A  second explanation for the mixed results is that PAC influence might also be 
determined  by  legislators'  characteristics,  like  their  need  for  funds.  Tosini  and 
Tower  (1987)  find  that  the  percentage  of  campaign  contributions  donated  by 
interest groups of the textile industry had a  significant impact on representatives 
for a specific protectionist textile bill, but not on senators. An explanation could be 
that  in  the  time period  considered  by the  authors  the  entire  House  was  up  for 
reelection,  whereas only one third of the Senate was in the process of campaign- 
ing.  Frendreis  and Waterman (1985)  also provide some empirical support for the 
hypothesis that  PAC  contributions  have more influence  when  an election  draws 
nearer. 
The third consideration concerns the strategy of the interest group under study. 
The activities of interest groups do not only affect legislators' positions, they are 
also affected by these positions. Both campaign contributions and policy decisions 
are endogenous variables and the relationship between them is an interdependent 
one.  Single-equation  estimation, employed in  a  number of (earlier) articles,  may 
suffer from a simultaneity bias. This bias may lead to both over- and underestima- 
tion  of  interest  group  influence,  depending  on  the  strategy  of  the  group  (see 
Chappell,  1981a,1982;  Snyder,  1991;  Stratmann,  1991,  1995a).  On the one hand, 
if  an  interest  group  mainly  donates  to  those  legislators  who  already  have  a 
congruent viewpoint, then the impact of money on legislators' stand is likely to be 
overestimated. On the other hand, if a group mainly donates to legislators who do 
not  take  a  favorable stand  in  the  hope  of swaying their  position,  the  impact of 
money  is  more  likely  to  be  underestimated.  Hence,  if different  groups  employ 
different  strategies,  single-equation  estimates  may  lead  to  mixed  results.  Apart 
from being insightful in  itself, an appraisal of the contribution strategy of interest 
groups  adds  to the  understanding  of the  (mixed) results  regarding  the  impact of 
contributions on legislative behavior. 
2.1.2.  The contribution strategy 
The theoretical  literature  provides two  competing models  for the  contribution 
strategy  of  interest  groups  (see  Morton  and  Cameron,  1992;  Potters  and  Van 
Winden,  1995;  Welch,  1974).  If an interest group takes the positions of candidates 
as given it will mainly try to get favored candidates elected and address its support 
and donations to  'friends', especially in those races that are expected to be close. 
This  is the  so-called position-induced or support model. If, on the other hand,  a 
group  takes  the  election  chances  of candidates  as  given,  it  will  mainly  try  to 
influence the policy position of candidates,  especially of those candidates  which 
are taking  a  stance  which  is not (yet) in  line  with the  group's preferences.  This 
so-called  service-induced  or  exchange  model  leads  to  the  prediction  that  an 
interest group will address its money to candidates from which they are likely to 
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candidates,  and  the  candidates  that  are  likely  to  be  (or  to  become)  powerful 
legislators. 
A  number of studies directly test both competing models against each other for 
several  types  of  interest  groups.  ~0  Other  studies  provide  information  on  the 
I1  determinants of donations without explicitly putting the two models to the test. 
For an assessment of the contribution strategy we will use information from both 
types of studies.  As  was  argued  above,  the  important relationships  are  between 
campaign contributions,  on the one hand,  and the expected election outcome, the 
policy position of candidates and their power, on the other hand. 
First,  expectations regarding  the  election outcome are often made operational 
by the actual vote share in either the previous or the present election.  Sometimes 
incumbency  is  taken  as  a  proxy  for  electoral  security.  Welch  (1980,  1981)  is 
among  the  earlier  studies.  He  finds  that  (economic)  interest  groups  aim  more 
money at likely winners,  using  a  measure based on the  actual vote share.  There 
also  seems  to  be  a  rather  robust  positive  relationship  between  incumbency  and 
contributions.  Most  of  the  PACs'  contributions  go  to  incumbents  and  not  to 
challengers.  ~2  These  results  provide  evidence  for  the  exchange  model.  More 
recently, the picture has become a little more subtle. For example, Snyder (1990, 
1992,  1993)  finds  that  the  contributions  from  economic  interest  groups  fit  the 
'quid  pro  quo'  model  much  better  than  those  from  ideological  groups  and 
individuals.  Ideological groups  are found  to focus their attention on close races, 
hinting  at a  support strategy (see also Welch,  1979).  What is more, a  number of 
studies found this positive relationship between contributions and expected close- 
ness  to  hold  for economic interest groups  as  well.  Jacobson (1980)  provides  an 
explanation  for the  latter result.  Incumbents can  usually  get  all  the  money they 
want for campaigning, and they simply want more when they are in a close race. 
Hence,  the  conjunction  of these  results  indicates  that  interest  groups,  especially 
economic groups, tend to address their money to likely winners (i.c.  incumbents). 
More money, however, is donated in races which are expected to be close. 
Second,  to  identify  a  candidate's  policy  position,  two  kinds  of measures  are 
being used: first, a general measure, based on past voting records (for incumbents) 
and  party affiliation,  and,  second,  a  more specific measure, based on  the  actual 
l0 Abler (1991),  Chappell (1982),  Hemdon (1982),  Keim and Zardkoohi (1988),  Langbein (1993), 
Maitland (1985), Saltzman (1987), Snyder (1990,  1992,  1993),  Stratmann (1991,  1995b),  Welch (1979. 
1980,  1981,  1982),  Wright (1985). 
tl E.g.,  Bennett  and  Loucks  (1994),  Endersby  and  Munger  (1992),  Gopoian  (1984),  Grenzke 
(1989a,b), Grief and Munger (1986,  1991,  1993),  Grier et al. (1990), Jacobson (1980), Kau and Rubin 
(1993), Kau et al. (1982), Palda and Palda (1985),  Poole and Romer (1985), Poole et al. (1987), Regens 
et al. (1991,  1994),  Romer and Snyder (1994), Silberman and Yochum (1980),  Stratmann (1992a,1994, 
1995a),  Wilhite and Theilmann (1986a,b, 1987). 
12 Apart from most studies in the two previous footnotes, see e.g. Eismeier and Pollock (1986) and 
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votes  of legislators  on  specific  issues  which  are  of interest  to  particular  groups. 
Studies  that  use  the  first  kind  of  measure  obtain  rather  robust  results.  Interest 
groups  mainly  give  along  ideological  lines,  with  corporate  PACs  donating  to 
conservatives and labor PACs  supporting  liberals.  Corporate  PACs tend to be less 
partisan,  though,  giving  to  both  Republicans  and  Democrats.  13  For  the  more 
specific  measures,  which  try  to  identify  a  group's  allies  on  particular  pieces  of 
legislation,  the  results  are  mixed.  ~4  Some  claim  to  find  evidence that  economic 
interest  groups  tend  to  give  to  congressmen  initially predisposed  to  vote  in  their 
favor,  others  suggest  that  they  contribute  to  legislators  likely to  be  undecided.  15 
For ideological groups  in particular,  the former result  seems  strongest.  In the gun 
control issue considered by Langbein (1993),  for instance,  the NRA and Handgun 
Control donated  only to like-minded extremists.  ~6 
Third, the power of (prospective)  legislators and their ability to supply political 
favors,  is largely determined by their position in the legislature.  Specifically, party 
affiliation, committee membership  and  seniority play a  role here.  Being a  member 
of the  majority  party,  for instance,  might  make  it  more  likely that  the  preferred 
policy  outcome  can  be  provided,  This  may  explain  why  corporate  PACs  give 
substantial  amounts  of money  to  (conservative)  representatives  from  the  Demo- 
cratic party.  17  Moreover, several studies indicate that economic interest groups, in 
particular,  tend to give more money to representatives who join important commit- 
tees,  18  thus  providing  support  for  the  exchange  model.  Committees  largely 
13 See, e.g., Chappell (1982), Gopoian (1984), Grier and Munger (1986,  1991), Keim and Zardkoohi 
(1988), Poole and Romer (1985), Sahzman (1987), Welch (1980, 1982). 
J4 For  instance,  these  more  specific  measures  obtain  swing  legislators  on  a  specific  issue  by 
considering how the legislator would vote based on her or his constituency interests (Stratmann,  1992a; 
Welch,  1982), or the measures are based on the correlation between the estimated vote and contribu- 
tions equation in a simultaneous equations model (Chappell,  1982; Stratmann,  1991). 
15 See,  e.g.,  Abler  (1991), Chappell  (1982)  and  Welch  (1982), and  Stratmann  (1991,  1992a), 
respectively. Welch (1982), however, does not take his results as evidence against the exchange model. 
He  introduces  the  'ex post  exchange  model'  in  which  contributions  are  rewards  for  candidates' 
favorable past behavior, rather than a means to ingratiate with candidates who are undecided ('ex ante 
exchange model'). Evidently, it is hard to distinguish the ex post exchange model empirically from the 
support  model.  Stratmann  (1995b) explicitly  incorporates  timing  in the  empirical  analysis  of PACs 
strategies.  He argues that PACs use the timing of contributions  as a tool to prevent  legislators from 
reneging on an implicit vote-for-contributions  contract,  and finds that PACs contribute  to undecided 
legislators mainly after a favorable vote. 
t6 In  passing,  we  note  that  the  support  model,  contrary  to  the  exchange  model,  excludes  the 
occurrence of 'split giving'. Langbein (1993) and Poole and Romer (1985) indeed find that contributors 
usually do not give to both candidates  in the same race or to both sides of an issue. Schlozman  and 
Tierney (1986), however, find split giving to occur quite often. 
17 All the empirical studies reviewed here relate to a time period that the Democratic party controlled 
the House. 
18 Bennett and Loucks  (1994),  Endersby  and Munger (1992),  Grenzke (1989b),  Grier  and Munger 
(1986,  1991), Munger (1989), Romer and Snyder (1994), Saltzman (1987), Stratmann (1991), Welch 
(1982) and Wilhite and Theilmann (1987). See Regens et al. (1991) and Wright (1985) for exceptions. J. Potters, R. Sloof  /  European Journal of Political Economy 12 (1996) 403-442  413 
control the agenda and hence their members possess political clout on the specific 
jurisdiction  of the committee. Interestingly, the effect of committee membership 
on contributions received is larger for the U.S. House of Representatives than for 
the  Senate,  where  the  power  of  committees  in  shaping  bills  is  diminutive.  19 
Finally,  even  though  seniority  is  correlated  with  committee  membership,  the 
results  seem  less  clear  cut  here.  Evidence  suggests  that  seniority  is  positively 
related to contributions from corporate PACs, but the results for labor PACs and 
ideological groups are more ambiguous. 20 
In summary, there is empirical evidence for elements from both the exchange 
model:  contributing  to  secure,  strong  but  undecided  candidates,  and  the  support 
model: giving in close races to like-minded candidates. However, corporate PACs 
appear to  lean  more heavily on  a  pragmatic exchange  strategy  than  ideological 
21  groups.  Labor PACs seem somewhere in between. 22  Hence, the differences in 
contributing strategy can help to explain the mixed results obtained concerning the 
impact of money on votes (in one-equation estimation). In particular, the impact of 
corporate contributions is more likely to be underestimated than those of ideologi- 
cal PACs. 
2.1.3. Lobbying 
Studies  that  incorporate  interest  group  activities  other than  donating  to  cam- 
paigns are rare. We have grouped these activities under the header 'lobbying', and 
most studies report a significant influence on policy. For example, Kau and Rubin 
(1979a)  consider voting on five bills  in  the  House on which  two public  interest 
lobbies  explicitly  endorsed  a  specific  policy  position  (see  also  Cropper  et  al., 
1992).  They take state per capita membership as a measure of the strength of the 
influence activity and show that these interest groups were effective in influencing 
votes  of representatives.  Segal  et  al.  (1992)  examine  senators'  vote  on  sixteen 
nominations for the U.S. Supreme Court. The number of organized interest groups 
presenting  testimony  for  and  against  the  nominee  at  the  Judiciary  Committee 
19 See Grier et al. (1990) and Grier and Munger (1993). Lindsay and Maloney (1988) and Regens et 
al. (1991,  1994) obtain the same dissimilarity between the lower and the upper house with respect to 
seniority. 
20 See, e.g., Grier and Munger (1986,  1991,  1993), Kau et al. (1982),  Kau and Rubin (1993),  Keim 
and Zardkoohi (1988). There is also some evidence that seniority may have a non-monotonic effect on 
contributions received (cf. Grier and Munger, 1991; Poole and Romer, 1985; Silberman and Yochum, 
1980; Wilhite and Theilmann, 1986a,b). 
2~ It  must be  noted,  however,  that  corporate  PACs  also  differ  among  each  other.  For  instance, 
Gopoian  (1984)  finds  oil  PACs  to  be  more  ideologically  (support)  oriented  than  defense  PACs. 
Similarly,  Clawson and  Neustadtl (1988)  find  the  contribution  strategy to  be  more  pragmatic (ex- 
change) if there is a high government involvement in the PAC's industry. 
22 Explanations given in  the  literature  for  the  different  strategies employed by  different  types of 
interest groups include, the different goals interest groups try to pursue (e.g. Welch, 1979), the way in 
which they raise (financial) support from their membership (e.g. Wright, 1985), and dissimilarities in 
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hearings  appeared  to  have  a  profound  effect.  Wright  (1990)  investigates  the 
influence of the number of lobbying contacts on committee voting. Questionnaires 
are used to identify the number of groups lobbying on each side of the issue and 
substantial influence is reported.  Sometimes, letters,  visits and phone calls are also 
found to have a  discernible  influence (Langbein,  1993).  Likewise,  Schneider and 
Naumann  (1982),  investigating  Switzerland's  direct  democracy,  find  that  the 
motions  and  applications  by small  and  medium  sized  business  are  successful  in 
dampening the spending increase of six out of nine items. On the other side, and to 
a  somewhat lesser extent,  farmers  and trade  unions  seem able  to further govern- 
ment spending. Their results suggest that influence is likely to be dependent on the 
issue  under  consideration  and  to  vary  over  interest  groups  (see  also  Esty  and 
Caves,  1983). 
Some studies do not focus on a specific lobbying activity, but find a significant 
impact  of  measures  of  an  interest  group's  overall  lobbying  activity  on  public 
policy.  For  instance,  Hoyt and  Toma  (1993)  find  lobbying expenditures  by  the 
National  Education  Association  to  have  a  significant  impact  on  the  salary  of 
teaching staff, and Leigh (1994) reports that the number of auto club lobbyists per 
capita had  a  positive  effect on the  number of required  state-wide  vehicle inspec- 
tions  per  year.  Similarly,  Mixon  (1995)  records  that  the  (estimated)  number  of 
registered lobbyists in an urban center significantly reduced the degree of citation, 
that is, the average number of days the center was in violation of carbon emissions 
standards.  23 
Just  like  donors,  lobbyists do not only affect the  positions  of politicians,  they 
are  also  affected  by these  positions.  The  studies  mentioned  above,  however,  all 
employ a  single-equation technique.  For a full evaluation of the results  then,  it is 
important to look at the lobbying strategies of interest groups. Similar to campaign 
contributions,  lobbying may be  aimed,  either to support and encourage  'friends', 
or to persuade legislators who are predisposed to take a stand which is against the 
group's  interest.  If the  former  lobbying  strategy  is  being  used,  single-equation 
models are likely to overestimate the impact of lobbying on a legislators stand.  In 
case of the latter strategy, the effect of lobbying may well be underestimated. 
The few studies that investigate the lobbying strategy of interest groups provide 
some tentative evidence that lobbying is mainly intended to alter policy positions. 24 
Austen-Smith and Wright (1994),  for instance,  test a game theoretic model which 
may explain  the  number  of groups  lobbying senators  predisposed  to  vote for or 
against  the  1987  nomination  of Bork for the  U.S.  Supreme  Court.  There  results 
23 We found only two studies that report no, or a very limited effect. Quinn and Shapiro (1991) find 
that the relative lobbying activity of business did not have a significant effect on tax policy, and Fowler 
and Shaiko (1987) report that grass roots lobbying by members of environmental groups only had a 
modest impact on a senator's vote. 
24 Interestingly, this is contrary to the conventional wisdom from the early sixties (e.g., Bauer et al., 
1963; Milbrath, 1963). J. Potters, R. Sloof  / European Journal of Political Economy 12 (1996) 403-442  415 
indicate that groups mainly lobbied 'unfriendly' legislators. Friendly senators were 
mainly lobbied to counteract lobbies from opposing groups. This result shows that 
lobbying is intended to alter a  legislators'  voting intentions.  Similarly, Hoyt and 
Toma (1993) find lobbying expenditures to be higher in states where the income 
position of teachers  is relatively bad.  Evidently, too few studies  exist to draw  a 
firm  conclusion,  but,  if  anything,  the  one-equation  results  are  more  likely  to 
underestimate the impact of lobbying than to overestimate it. 
A  final  issue  we  briefly  want  to  touch  upon  is  the  relation  between  the 
contribution  strategy  and  the  lobbying strategy.  Wright  (1990)  argues  that  con- 
tributing  and  lobbying  are  complementary  activities  and  have  to  be  analyzed 
jointly. In his empirical analysis the number of groups lobbying appears to depend 
(weakly) on the number of groups contributing, suggesting that contributions may 
facilitate access and amplify lobbying messages. 25  Langbein (1993)  investigates 
both  contributions  and  lobbying of membership interest  groups.  As  opposed to 
contributions,  lobbying is  less  visible and  can be strategically directed  to oppo- 
nents or pivotal legislators without antagonizing the group's membership. Indeed, 
the  targets  of  lobbying  on  average  appear  to  be  more  moderate  than  those 
addressed by money, suggesting that lobbying is more exchange and less support 
oriented than contributing. 
2.2.  Characteristics of interest groups and their enuironment 
When no data on interest group activity are available, the only route open is to 
try  and  relate  public  policy  variables to  structural  characteristics  of the  interest 
groups  (cf.  the  structure-performance  approach  in  industrial  organization).  An 
important  issue  in  this  respect  is  whether  political  actions  of a  group  have  an 
independent role or a facilitating role in shaping public policy. In the former case 
both  a  group's  political  actions  and  its  structural  characteristics  independently 
influence policy. In the latter case, political actions are a  sort of transaction cost 
that  has  to  be  born  by  the  interest  group  in  order  for  its  favorable  structural 
attributes to be effectuated. Under the facilitating role of political actions a group's 
characteristics can be expected to serve as reasonably good instrumental variables 
for  the  group's  political  activities.  Of  course,  the  relationship  between  public 
policy variables and interest group characteristics is  also of interest  in  itself,  for 
interest groups may exert influence without engaging in explicit political activities 
(cf. Lindblom,  1977). 
Esty and Caves (1983) find preliminary evidence for both a facilitating and an 
independent  role  of  political  expenditures  (on  hiring  lobbyists  and  setting  up 
25 Also Humphries (1991) concludes that contributions are used to support lobbying activities. He 
finds, inter alia, a positive link between the number of corporate lobbyists and the amount of money 
contributed to the corporate PAC. Direct evidence that money buys access, measured by the time 
interest groups spend with a politician, is provided by Langbein (1986). 416  J. Potters, R. Sloof / European Journal of Political Economy 12 (1996) 403-442 
PACs). 26  On the one hand,  an industry's political expenditures can be explained 
fairly well by its structural attributes. 27  On the other hand,  political expenditures 
have a  significant impact on a  group's political success even if it is controlled for 
various kinds of structural attributes of an  industry.  Because  of the first result it 
seems quite possible to try and find good proxies for an interest group's political 
activity,  when  direct  data  on  these  activities  are  unavailable.  The  latter  result 
indicates that one must keep in mind that political activities may vary over interest 
groups  -  and  have  an  impact  on  policy  outcomes  -  in  a  way  which  is  not 
completely parallel to their structural characteristics. 
Most variables included as proxies for activity relate, either to the  stake of a 
group  to  influence policy, or to  the  free-rider problem of collective action.  The 
results of these two measures will be reviewed first. 28  Then we look at variables 
that  are  not  proxies  for  a  group's  activities,  but  may  independently  affect  its 
political success. These variables include attributes of the group under study, and 
policy supply side variables which  strengthen or weaken  interest group influence 
on the policy process. 
2.2.1.  Stakes and collective  action 
An  interest  group  that  has  a  large  stake  in  influencing  policy-makers  and 
regulatory agents is hypothesized to be more politically active and hence to have a 
larger  impact  on  policy.  Typical  variables  used  to  measure  the  stake  of  a 
producer's group  or industry in  influencing government policies are the  average 
size of the producers and the percentage of proprietorial income. 29  "The  size of 
an average production unit, given the number of producers, is expected to have a 
positive  effect  on  protection  because  the  size  of  the  gains  per  interest  group 
member  will be greater,  increasing incentives for participation in pressure group 
activities"  (Gardner,  1987,  p.  305),  and,  "owner-farmers  would  tend  to  favor 
[government]  investment  in  agricultural  research  more  than  tenant  farmers,  be- 
cause owner-farmers would capture a larger share of the increase in the producers' 
surplus"  (Guttman,  1978,  p. 475).  Another variable used to measure stakes is the 
degree  of government  involvement  in  an  industry  (Esty  and  Caves,  1983).  The 
defense  industry,  for  instance,  is  often  thought  to  have  a  large  stake  to  try  and 
influence  political decision-making. Also  a  high  level  of competition or  import 
26 See also Wright (1989). He claims to find evidence that lobbying and contributions are used to 
reinforce the appearance of an  existing organizational base, and, thus, for the facilitating role of 
political activities. Grenzke (1989a) raises a similar point. 
27 This result is fairly robust for political activity in general (cf. Grier et al., 1991, 1994; Humphries, 
1991 ; Kennelly and Murrell, 1991 ; McKeown, 1994; Pittman, 1976, 1977, 1988; and Zardkoohi, 1985). 
28 Because these interest group variables are not legislator-specific,  they are usually related to general 
policy outcomes and not to voting by individual legislators. 
29 See, e.g., Gardner (1987), Guttman (1978), Hunter and Nelson (1989), Kamath (1989), Miller 
(1991), Pincus (1975), Salamon and Siegfried (1977). J. Potters, R. Sloof  /  European Journal of Political Economy 12 (1996) 403-442  417 
penetration are expected to increase an industry's demand for government inter- 
vention (Jarrell,  1978; Trefler,  1993). If competitive pressures are high and prices 
are  low,  an  industry  is  more  likely  to  vie  for protective regulation.  The  stake 
variables  mentioned  are  often  significant  and  usually  have  the  predicted  sign. 
These results suggest that the approach to take measures of stake as a proxy for a 
group's political activities is a sensible one if direct data on political activities are 
unavailable. 
A second proxy for a group's political activities is the degree to which it is able 
to  solve  the  free-riding  problem  of  collective  action.  If free  riding  is  severe, 
political activity will be low. A distinction can be made here, between direct (or ex 
post) and indirect (or ex ante) measures of free riding. For ideological groups and 
labor  unions,  often  a  direct  measure  is  available  in  the  form  of  number  or 
percentage of members. 30  Membership rates of an  organized interest group  are 
often found to be significant and to have the predicted sign.  For example, Bloch 
(1993) finds the degree of unionization to be positively related to the support for 
minimum wage legislation,  and Kischgassner and Pommerehne (1988)  even find 
union  membership to have a  significant positive impact on government expendi- 
ture  in  Switzerland.  Hence,  a  direct  (ex  post)  measure,  indicating  that  the  free 
riding  problem  has  in  fact  been  solved,  often  has  a  significant  effect  on  the 
possibility to achieve favorable public policy. 31 
There are also many interests which have no formal organization, or member- 
ship  data are unavailable.  In that case indirect (ex  ante) proxies for the  level of 
collective action have to be used, like the mere number of producers in an industry 
or some measure of concentration.  Such indirect measures give more ambiguous 
results,  however. Geographical concentration and concentration of sales are often 
hypothesized to alleviate free riding due to an increased possibility of communica- 
tion  and orchestration of political action.  Most scholars indeed find an increased 
scope for political influence  with  higher  degrees  of concentration,  but  there  are 
many that find no effect or even a  negative effect. 32  Equally ambiguous are the 
results of the use of numbers as a proxy for the free rider effect. A large number of 
potential participants  to collective action  is  usually  hypothesized to increase  the 
30 E.g.,  Bloch (1993),  Graddy (1991),  Guttman (1978),  Hird (1993),  McArthur and Marks (1988), 
Meier (1987),  Meier and McFarlane (1992),  Naert (1990),  Nelson and Silberberg (1987),  Pashigian 
(1985), Peltzman (1984) and Plotnick (1986). 
31 A  somewhat different line of inquiry relates the number  of organized interest groups in a state or 
country to political variables. The general argument is that most interest groups pursue goals which 
give  an  upward pressure on legislative output (i.e.  the number of bills),  and the amount of public 
spending and taxes. For some evidence regarding this hypothesis, see Benson and Engen (1988) and 
Mueller and Murrell (1986). 
32 A  positive effect of concentration is found by Esty and Caves (1983),  Gardner (1987),  Guttman 
(1980),  Kalt and Zupan (1984),  and Trefler (1993).  Negative, ambiguous or insignificant effects are 
reported in Becker (1986), Cahan and Kaempfer (1992), Pincus (1975),  Quinn and Shapiro (1991), and 
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free riding problem. Sometimes indeed a  negative effect of numbers on influence 
is reported. More often, however, a positive effect is found. 33  Hence, there seems 
to  be  relatively  little  direct  empirical  support  for  the  Olson  (1965)  influential 
theoretical  study on collective action. 
For both concentration and numbers, one could also conclude that the relation- 
ship  between  these  proxies  and  the  independent variables  is  not  only driven by 
free-riding effects  but also  by effects  which  relate  to  the  political strength  of an 
interest group. For example, it is sometimes argued that a geographically dispersed 
industry not only has more problems of organization, but also has a  leverage on a 
larger group of local representatives and, hence, a broader political base of support 
(Schonhardt-Bailey,  1991).  34  Similarly,  large  groups  not  only  have  a  larger 
free-riding problem but also have more (electoral) resources. Probably the relation- 
ship between numbers and influence is  not a  linear one,  and perhaps  not even a 
monotonic one.  This  conclusion is  supported  by Guttman (1978)  who  finds that 
the  effect  of the  number of producers  on  influence is  more  likely to  be  positive 
when  a  state  has  a  relatively large  number of producers.  This  would  suggest  a 
marginally  increasing  effect  of  numbers.  This  finding  is  not  robust,  however. 
Miller  (1991)  finds  that  the  number  of  farmers  has  a  positive  impact  on  its 
influence in developed countries but a negative impact in less developed countries. 
With the relative number of farmers  in developed  countries being much  smaller, 
this  finding would  suggest  a  marginally decreasing  effect  of numbers on  influ- 
35  ence.  Nevertheless,  the conclusion remains that the relationship between num- 
bers and influence is an intricate one, which might be non-monotonic, and which, 
in addition, might be dependent on the type of interest group (Van Velthoven and 
Van Winden,  1986). 
2.2.2.  Political success 
Some interest groups receive a  better hearing in politics than others.  Moreover, 
a  group  may  have  more  influence at  one  time  than  at  another  time,  or  book  a 
33 For a negative effect, see Miller (1991), Plotnick (1986), Trefler (1993), Young (1991), fbr a 
positive effect, see, e.g., Abler (1991), Becker (1986), Boucher (1991), Congleton and Shugart (1990), 
Kristov et al. (1992), Leigh (1994), Pincus (1975), Renaud and Van Winden (1991), Stigler (1971), for 
ambiguous  or  insignificant  effects, see  Graddy  and  Nichol  (1989), Michaels  (1992), Neck  and 
Schneider (1988),Nelson (1982), Renaud and Van Winden (1988), Salamon and Siegfried (1977). 
34 In addition, concentration may affect a group's stake in obtaining favorable policy. For instance, a 
highly concentrated industry may not need political assistance to secure high profits. Hence, concentra- 
tion may lower the costs, but may also decrease the benefits of political action. Whether concentrated 
industries are more or less politically active -  and, thus, which of the two effects dominates -  is 
studied in Grief et al. (1991. 1994), Munger (1988), Pittman (1976, 1977, 1988), and Zardkoohi (1985, 
1988). 
35 it is possible that in the case of international comparisons there are too many disturbing factors to 
warrant conclusions on the effect of numbers. The effect of numbers might be lower in less developed 
countries because of the lower democratic quality of governments in these countries or because of 
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success  with  one  policy  issue  but  not  with  another.  There  is  a  wide  variety  of 
variables  that  figures  in  the  empirical  literature  to  pick  up  such  differences  in 
political  success.  Sometimes these variables  are attributes  of the interest group or 
the  issue  under  study;  often  these  variables  refer to  the  political  system,  to  the 
public at large, or even to the state of the economy. Though it is not a trivial task 
to  try  and  classify  these  different  variables,  by  and  large  three  main  groups  of 
variables  can  be  distinguished  in  the  empirical  literature.  The  first  group  of 
variables  refers to the political  strength of a  group, the second to the presence of 
oppositional  or  coalitional  (lobbying)  groups,  and  the  third  to  the  electoral 
pressures on the polity. 
The first group of variables can be thought of as referring to a group's political 
strength or leverage. Certain  attributes  of a  group or its environment are found to 
affect its success in politics arena.  For example,  as was seen above, many authors 
argue that variables relating to the size of a group and its geographical dispersion 
make  collective action more difficult.  Simultaneously,  these  very same  variables 
might very well  be  among the  attributes  which give a  group greater leverage  in 
politics.  It is  very hard  to disentangle  the  two  effects,  and  there  seems  to be  no 
systematic evidence that one of the two effects is generally stronger, or stronger in 
particular cases. Equally ambiguous results are obtained for the average or relative 
income position of the members of an interest group. Some find a positive, others 
a  negative  effect  on  a  group's political  success.  36  Again,  a  double-tiered  effect 
may be  at  work here.  On the  one  hand,  if a  group's average or relative  income 
position is bad, it has a larger stake to do something about it and it may be easier 
to  demonstrate  that  political  support  is  'really'  needed.  On  the  other  hand,  if 
income  is  bad,  a  group  may  lack  the  resources  to  back  up  or  start  political 
activities.  Also  with  respect  to  income,  there  is  no  evidence  that  one  effect 
dominates  the other.  We shall now concentrate on some less  ambiguous determi- 
nants of political  success. 
For  producer  groups  some  factors  have  been  found  that  seem  supportive  ot' 
favorable government intervention.  37  If an industry is  struck by large unemploy- 
ment  then  this  unfortunate  feature  clearly  promotes  a  plea  for  protectionist 
measures.  Also  industries  that  are  hurt  by  large  duties  on  inputs  have  an  easier 
time to get  'compensating' protection.  Hence, being in need (stake!?) favors your 
case.  What  also favors  the  position  of producers  is  that prices  of substitutes  are 
high. This appealing argument is brought to the fore by Beghin (1990) and can be 
36 See, e.g.,  Kamath (1989),  Trefler (1993),  and Stigler (1971), and, Bullock (1992), Congleton and 
Shugart  (1990),  Gardner  (1987),  and  Salamon  and  Siegfried  (1977),  respectively.  See  Cahan  and 
Kaempfer (1992) for an insignificant effect. 
37 See, e.g.,  Beghin (1990), Boucher (1991), Cahan and Kaempfer (1992), Pincus (1975), Quinn and 
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derived from a  game-theoretic model of bargaining. 38  He argues that producers 
are in a better position to bargain for high regulated prices if the outside option for 
consumers  and  government (to buy  substitutes)  is  unfavorable,  Furthermore,  for 
non-industrial  groups Plotnick (1986)  finds  that the  'quality'  of the  membership 
matters. Studying the inter-state differences in child-support, he finds that the level 
of transfers is negatively related to the percentage of non-white recipients and the 
percentage of mothers with illegitimate children. Having members with low social 
status seems to harm your case. Summarizing the findings with respect to political 
strength, there appears to be some indication that being in need, having a  strong 
bargaining position, and being of high social status help to get favorable govern- 
ment intervention. 
Second, a fairly robust finding is that a group has more political success if it is 
likely  to  encounter  a  (strong)  coalitional  force  in  the  political  arena,  and,  con- 
versely, that the  presence of an oppositional lobby is harmful to its case. 39  For 
instance, Teske (1991)  finds that the presence of a  government funded consumer 
advocacy harms the case of the telecommunications business. Others argue that the 
composition of government may provide an interest group with a coalitional torce 
within the polity, increasing the group's political success.  In this respect Graddy 
and  Nichol  (1989)  report  that,  at  the  expense  of  the  regulated  health  care 
professions, consumer interests are better served when licensing boards consist of 
a larger number of public members (i.e.  individuals  who are not members of the 
regulated profession).  Similarly, the relative number of females in  local councils 
appears  to  have  a  positive  effect  on  the  supply  of  day-care  for  children  by 
municipalities,  an  effect found  for both the  Netherlands  (Van  Dijk et al.,  1993) 
and Sweden (Gustafsson and Stafford, 1992).  Often, however, less direct measures 
of opposition and  support are used.  Abrams and  Settle (1993),  for instance,  find 
that  the  high  rate  of  bank  failures  during  the  great  depression  resulted  in 
pro-branching legislation. They claim that the high failure rate reduced the number 
-  and, thus, the political power -  of unit bankers opposed to branching,  and lead 
consumers of banking services to support the pro-branching movement. Guttman 
(1978) counts the number of firms that produce inputs for the farmers under study 
and finds that the presence of many suppliers helps the farmers' case in politics. 
Guttman's presumption is that suppliers hope to share some of the additional rent 
created by the farmers' political action (see also Kamath,  1989).  Esty and Caves 
(1983)  count  the  number of industries  that  are  customers  of the  industry  under 
study and find that the presence of many customers is harmful tbr a group's case. 
Here  the  supposition  is  that  customers  lear  to  lose  from  supra-marginal  prices 
38 For other applications of this game theoretic model of bargaining, see Svejnar (1986), Zusman 
(1976), Zusman and Amiad (1977). 
39 See e.g., besides the studies cited in  the examples, Boucher (1991), Graddy (1991), Plomick 
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created by an industry's political efforts. Less ad hoc and more convincing perhaps 
is  the  Gardner  (1987)  hypothesis that  producers  are  less  likely  to  obtain  high 
regulated prices, the larger the burden that such prices lay on consumers (cf. the 
theoretical model of Becker, 1983). Gardner uses demand and supply elasticities to 
measure the deadweight losses of redistribution and finds these to be significant. 
Likewise, Globerman and Kadonaga (1994) investigate the distributive effects of 
telephone rate regulation across different categories of consumers, and they find 
evidence that higher deadweight costs of cross-subsidization reduce the  level of 
cross-subsidies. Hence, though sometimes measured a little ad hoc, the incorpora- 
tion  of (potential)  friends  or  foes  is  likely to  improve the  fit of the  estimated 
relationship. 
Now we turn to a third and final group of variables that affect a group's hearing 
in  politics.  The  variables  in  this  group  all  somehow  relate  to  the  electoral  or 
democratic pressures on the polity. The general supposition is that self-interested 
politicians have to make a  trade-off between, on the one hand, the benefits they 
receive from special interest groups in return for special favors, and, on the other 
hand, the electoral damage that may result from supplying these special favors. 40 
Variables  that  affect this  trade-off will  thus  have  an  impact  on  the  amount  of 
favors provided to  special interest groups.  In particular,  if policy-makers are  in 
severe electoral competition, there is less discretion to disregard voters' interests 
and less room to give in to demands by special interest groups. Of course, if an 
interest group commands considerable electoral resources, either directly or indi- 
rectly, then electoral pressure might favor a group's position (e.g., Plotnick, 1986; 
Stigler, 1971).  For instance, we already saw that campaign contributions are found 
to have a  stronger impact on legislative voting when an election draws near and 
there is  increased need for campaign funds.  On  average,  however, the literature 
suggests that (special) interest groups have an easier time influencing politicians 
which are under low democratic pressure and have considerable discretion. 4~ 
A  first measure for electoral pressure is the level of inter-party competition in 
congress,  defined as  the  ratio  of the  number  of seats  of the  minority  and  the 
majority  party.  A  higher  level  of  inter-party  competition  is  found  to  make 
legislators  less  apt to supply special favors.  "Since greater competition expands 
the  scope of conflict within the political system, interest group power would be 
checked by the need of the political parties to broaden popular support for their 
candidates and policies" (Young,  1991,  p.  812).  Second, many studies find that 
per  capita  income  has  a  positive  impact  on  particular  government  spending 
40 For theoretical  models,  see Appelbaum and Katz (1987),  Bental and Ben-Zion (1975),  Ben-Zion 
and Eytan (1974),  Denzau and Munger (1986),  Peltzman (1976) and Welch (1974). 
4J See, e.g.,  Abler (1991),  Becker (1986),  Boucher (1991),  Graddy (1991),  McCormick and Tollison 
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categories. 42  Some  argue  that  per  capita  income  represents  a  measure  for  the 
opportunity costs of voters to monitor the political process and that special interest 
groups therefore have an easier time to vie for an increase of particular expendi- 
tures. Others, however, argue that here a demand side effect is at work, as many of 
these  government  expenditures  are  luxury  goods  to  the  voters.  Third,  equivocal 
results  are  obtained with  respect to  the  degree of urbanization.  McCormick  and 
Tollison  (1981)  report  a  negative  impact  on  interest  group  influence.  They 
conclude that urbanization makes it easier for the public to engage in counterbal- 
ancing lobbying. Contrarily, Stigler (1971) finds a positive impact and argues that 
urbanization makes it easier for an interest group to solicit electoral support for its 
case.  Finally, and less ambiguous perhaps,  is the suggestion that a  well-informed 
constituency  makes  congress  less  susceptible to  the  demands  of special interests 
and more prone to serve the public interest. 43  Becker (1986),  for instance, finds 
that it is harder for the dentist profession to obtain entry restrictions if a  state is 
characterized by a  well-educated electorate. Graddy and Nichol (1989)  obtain the 
same result for registered nurses.  Relatedly, as was  already seen  in  the  previous 
section, campaign contributions are less likely to buy a  favorable legislative vote 
when there is high media coverage of the issues concerned. Hence, on the whole, 
the picture is that electoral pressure decreases politicians' susceptibility to specific 
demands by interest groups. 
2.3.  Summary 
There is ample evidence that interest groups affect the political decision-making 
process. There  is  substantive evidence that  campaign contributions influence the 
behavior of legislators, though  the  results  are  not  unambiguous  (cf.  Morton  and 
Cameron,  1992).  Some  of  the  variation  in  the  effect  of  contributions  can  be 
accounted for by the different contribution strategies pursued by interest groups. 
Corporate PACs seem more keen on  affecting legislators' policy stand,  ideologi- 
cally oriented PACs  tend  to  address their money  to  like-minded legislators, and 
labor  groups  are  somewhere  in  between.  Certainly,  the  impact  of  campaign 
contributions also varies with the characteristics of the issue under consideration. 
A  narrow  scope and  low  visibility seem  to  foster moneyed influence.  This  is  in 
line with the relatively high effectiveness of lobbying activities reported, although 
here too few studies exist to claim robust results. 
42 See, e.g., Congleton and Shugart (1990), Guttman (1978), Hoyt and Toma (1993), McCormick and 
Tollison (1981), Kristov et al. (1992), Mueller and Murrell (1986), Naert (1990), Plotnick (1986). 
43 Some indirect support for this suggestion is given by the studies that find that education increases 
an individual's willingness to participate in politics, both with respect to individual contributions to 
Congressmen (Snyder, 1993; Welch, 1981) as to membership in public interest groups (Kau and Rubin, 
1979a), and studies that report a positive relationship between the level of education and the number of 
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When  no  data  on  activity  are  available,  various  measures  of stake  are  often 
found  to have a  positive effect on  a  group's cause in  the policy process.  These 
results suggest that stake is a sensible proxy for political activity and success. The 
same  holds  for  more  direct  measures  of  a  group's  collective  action.  Variables 
which  measure  a  group's  organized  membership are  often  found  to  increase  its 
political success. Indirect (ex ante) proxies for a group's collective action, like the 
number and dispersion of potential participants, give ambiguous results. Probably, 
the results of numbers and dispersion are driven by an intricate combination of, on 
the one hand, their effect on free riding, and on the other hand, their effect on the 
potential resources  of a  group  and  its  base of political  support.  There  does  not 
seem to be any systematic evidence that one of the effects is stronger in general. 
Three groups of variables that affect a group's political success were identified. 
One group of variables relates to the political leverage and strength of an interest 
group.  It was found that political success is positively related to the  'needs' of a 
group, its bargaining position, and the social standing of the average member. The 
evidence here is rather scant, however. The two other groups of variables refer to 
the oppositional and coalitional forces an interest  group is likely to encounter in 
the  political  arena,  either  organized  or  unorganized.  The  presence  of  strong 
coalitional  (oppositional)  force  clearly  seems  to  help  (hurt)  a  group's  case  in 
politics.  Moreover,  there  is  evidence  that  a  well-informed  and  active  electorate 
may be  among  the  oppositional  forces  of an  interest  group,  especially in  times 
when politicians are in great need of electoral support. 
3. Discussion: Problems and perspectives 
In this section some qualifications are made concerning the results reviewed in 
the  previous  section.  Though  most  of  the  topics  we  will  touch  upon  already 
received some attention, here they are put in a broader perspective. The qualifica- 
tions  concern  the  simultaneity  of  agents'  decisions  in  the  political-economic 
system, the empirical analysis of the relative influence of interest groups, and the 
acquisition  and  interpretation  of data  and results.  Together these  reflections will 
point  at  some problems in  the  present  empirical literature,  and,  simultaneously, 
point at some perspectives and suggestions for future research. 
3.1.  Simultaneous  relationships and appropriate  estimation  techniques 
Interest groups do not only affect public policy, their actions are also affected 
by policy. This simultaneity was already discussed when interest groups' political 
strategies  were  surveyed.  To  keep that  overview well-running,  some gradations 
related to these specific simultaneous relationships were left out.  First we correct 
for this bias, then we proceed with some general elaborations on simultaneity. 
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discussed in the previous section,  the exchange and the  support model,  focus on 
one side of the political market. These basic models do not take explicit account of 
the demand for contributions by legislators.  However, demand side considerations 
are said to be important, especially for the exchange model in which the legislator 
has  to  supply  political  favors  or  effort  in  return  for  funds. 44  Due  to  political 
opportunity costs,  candidates  may have  a  weak  incentive  to change their  policy 
position,  grant political  favors or supply effort in exchange for funds.  They may 
even refuse  to  accept contributions  because  they do not  want to get committed. 
The demand for campaign funds is usually hypothesized to be related to the stakes 
candidates  have  in  obtaining  the  legislative  seat,  to  the  candidate's  expected 
probability  of (re)election,  and  to  the  existence  of alternative  sources  to  foster 
electoral  support.  These  variables  can be related  to observed campaign contribu- 
tions and expenditures in order to see whether demand considerations, and not just 
supply  considerations,  play  a  role.  We  will  briefly  review  some  of the  results 
which suggest that indeed this is the case. 
The  candidate's  stake  in  obtaining  the  seat  is  typically  approximated  by 
characteristics  of  the  political  institution  the  candidate  is  running  for.  These 
characteristics  include  the  government's budget  size,  the  length  of a  politician's 
term,  and  the  number  of legislative  seats.  45  Typically,  a  significant  effect  on 
campaign expenditures  is  found.  For example,  Crain  and  Tollison  (1977)  find  a 
positive relationship  between  the length of a  single  office of a  governor and  per 
period campaign expenditures,  and that limitations  on the number of consecutive 
terms  reduce  these  expenditures.  Also  the  number  of  legislative  seats  has  a 
negative  impact of individual  candidates'  expenditures,  allegedly  due  to a  lower 
attractiveness  of  each  individual  seat  (Crain  et  al.,  1977).  The  demand  for 
contributions may also depend on the candidate's perceived (re)election chances. It 
is  typically  hypothesized  that  incumbents  solicit  more  contributions  when  their 
opponent is  better  funded  and  when  they  expect  a  close race.  Indeed,  empirical 
evidence  suggests  that  total  contributions  received  by  the  challenger  and  the 
closeness of the election are significant positive determinants  of the contributions 
received  by the  incumbent. 46  Similarly,  Abrams  (1981)  finds  that  gubernatorial 
races  with  no  substantial  inter-party  competition  are  less  costly.  Finally,  the 
demand for contributions could be related to the availability of alternative sources 
to  obtain  voter  support.  For  example,  in  Lott  (1987b)  the  incumbent's  tenure, 
measuring  the  period  of free  media  coverage,  appears  to  act  as  a  substitute  for 
campaigning in building up a political  'brand name'.  Also, some candidates have 
44 See, e.g., Giertz and Sullivan (1977), Palda (1992), Silberman and Yochum (1980), and Wilhite 
and Theilmann (1986a,b). Snyder (1990, 1993) finds some evidence to the contrary, though. 
45 See Abrams (1981), Abrams and Settle (1978), Crain et al. (1977), Crain and Tollison (1976, 
1977), Gifford and Santoni (1978), Palda (1992). 
46 See Jacobson (1980), Kau et  al.  (1982), Kau and  Rubin (1993), Wilhite (1988), Wilhite and 
Theilmann (1987), and most of the studies mentioned in footnotes 9 and 10 respectively. J. Potters, R. Sloof  /  European Journal of Political Economy 12 (1996) 403-442  425 
own funds or party funds for campaigning. These funds, however, can have both a 
negative and a positive effect on PAC contributions. Some find that own funds are 
a  substitute  for PAC  money (cf.  Silberman  and  Yochum,  1980),  others  find  a 
positive  relationship  (e.g.,  Keim  and  Zardkoohi,  1988).  The  latter  result  may 
indicate that PAC money and party funds are complements in the production of 
votes (demand effect), but it might also be the case that party funds serve as 'seed 
money' to establish credibility among PACs (supply effect). 
The observed campaign  contributions to  candidates  are  the  outcome of both 
demand and supply considerations. When demand considerations are incorporated, 
it  becomes  more difficult to  distinguish  competing  models  for interest  groups' 
contributions strategies empirically. 47 This is caused by the fact that demand and 
supply considerations may be in conflict. Take, for instance, the expected proba- 
bility of (re)election. On  the  one hand,  interest groups  may be willing  to offer 
more money to secure candidates (exchange model). On the other hand, a secure 
candidate may demand fewer contributions and be less inclined to supply favors in 
return. The exchange model in which demand considerations are accounted for is 
compatible then with both larger and smaller contributions to likely winners, and, 
thus,  hard to distinguish empirically from the support model. 48  This problem is 
partly caused by the fact that notions like willingness and ability to supply favors 
are difficult to make operational, but also by the lack of theoretical models which 
yield clear cut competing hypotheses. 
Generally speaking, the importance of both demand and supply considerations 
for  the  actual  public  policy  outcome  is  a  consequence  of  the  simultaneous 
relationships between the actors in the political system. When a single equation is 
estimated  to  determine  the  influence  of an  interest  group's  activity  on  public 
policy,  an  assumed  equilibrium  equation  instead  of a  structural  relationship  is 
estimated.  That  is,  the  equation  does  not  represent  a  public  policy production 
function and the estimated coefficient on the group's activity cannot be interpreted 
as the marginal product of the activity on public policy. When the coefficient is 
interpreted in  such a  way, though,  simultaneity bias  might result.  Moreover, the 
analysis  of  assumed  equilibrium  equations  does  not  give  much  insight  in  the 
underlying structural relationships, since demand and supply influences are usually 
hard to disentangle.  An assumed equilibrium equation might be compatible with 
different  kinds  of  structural  relationships  (cf.  the  identification  problem).  For 
example, when one observes that the interest group's position and the legislator's 
47 The models are  even more difficult  to distinguish empirically when one introduces dynamics and 
an ongoing relationship between contributors and legislators. 
48 To  provide  an  example,  Welch  (1982)  finds  a  negative  relationship  between  expected  vole 
percentage and contributions received and takes this as support for the exchange model.  He argues that 
the exchange model predicts that,  though the largest gifts go to likely  winners they do not go to sure 
winners who are not appreciative  of the gift's size.  He notes that  the  result also endorses the support 
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position coincide at the end of the policy-making process, it might be the case that 
the interest group addressed its action at friends, or that the interest group swayed 
the opinion of the legislator (cf. Snyder,  1991). 
Empirical  studies  should  recognize  the  reciprocal  causation  between  agents' 
decisions  and  employ an  appropriate estimation  technique  when  estimating  (as- 
sumed) structural  equations.  The methodological problems observed are typically 
more prominent in the earlier studies. As the number of empirical studies expands 
over  time,  substantial  attention  is  being  paid  to  the  importance  of  using  the 
appropriate econometric methods.  Future  studies  should also employ these  meth- 
ods.  Some authors recommend to analyse a more complete political system when 
investigating  the  determinants  of public  policy.  For example,  Kau  et  al.  (1982) 
estimate a system of structural equations which includes legislators, interest groups 
and voters. Others, referring to the identification problem, doubt whether estima- 
tion of structural relationships in the political system is possible at all.  49  Without 
taking sides,  we belief that estimated (structural  or equilibrium) equations  should 
preferably be  based on  assumptions  about  underlying  preferences  of agents  and 
relationships  between the  agents.  Without  sufficient theoretical  underpinning  the 
empirical model  becomes rather ad hoc  and  the  estimated equations  may fail to 
have a clear cut interpretation. 5o 
3.2.  The  relative influence of interest groups 
The  review  in  Section  2  mainly  analyzed  interest  groups  in  isolation.  The 
relationship with other interest groups and unorganized interests was only briefly 
mentioned.  It  appeared  that  the  presence  of  an  opposing  interest  group  or  a 
well-informed electorate reduces the  influence  of the interest  group under  study. 
These  results  harmonize  with  the  general  presumption  that  public  policy  is  the 
outcome of a  trade-off between several interests  in  society. However, the  results 
do  not  indicate  the  relative  importance  of these  several  interests.  They  do  not 
provide a complete answer to the question whether interest groups are one of the 
major determinants of public policy or whether their influence is relatively minor. 
For an assessment of interest groups' relative influence the query for the relevant 
model of the principle determinants of public policy becomes important. 
Often, the interaction between a legislator and the private sector in a representa- 
tive  democracy  is  envisaged  as  a  principal-agent  relationship  in  which  the 
legislator-agent  wants  to  get  reelected  by  the  constituents-principals  (Barro, 
1973).  When  voters are completely informed and  can punish  legislators immedi- 
ately,  congressmen  should  vote as  their constituency  desires.  Political  power or 
49 Giertz and Sullivan (1977), Jacobson (1985), Snyder (1990). 
5o See, e.g., Austen-Smith and Wright (1994), Beghin (1990) and Snyder (1990) for nice illustrations 
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influence  of interest  groups,  other  than  electoral  influence,  does  not  exist.  In 
reality,  individual  voters  cannot  monitor  politicians  costlessly  and  uncertainty 
exists about the effects of policy decisions. This introduces some slack in control 
of legislators  and might result in  some room for discretionary behavior. 51  This 
may lead to influence by special interest groups, or to legislators pursuing other 
narrow personal goals alongside just reelection. The influence of interest groups 
on  a  legislator's  behavior  is  thus  constrained  by  the  preferences  of  his  con- 
stituency. In order to establish the relative influence of interest groups it is then 
important to establish the preferences of the constituency and their impact on the 
legislator's behavior. When, for instance, the interests of the constituency and the 
interests of a  specific interest group are largely aligned, the observation that the 
legislator behaves in the  group's  interests does not directly indicate the  group's 
influence. Moreover, since constituency preferences constrain the legislator, they 
52  also affect the interest group's strategy in influencing the political process. 
The determination of constituency preferences is  not without problems, how- 
ever. Most empirical studies use relatively broad demographic and socioeconomic 
measures, like per capita income, education, race, religion, degree of urbanization 
and  unemployment.  Hence,  the  relevant economic and  ideological interests  the 
legislator or polity is supposed to represent are just approximated by the average 
characteristics  of  the  district.  In  fact,  these  studies  implicitly  assume,  when 
interpreted in  the  framework of the  principal-agent  model,  the  mean  (median) 
voter to be the relevant principal for the legislator-agent. However, this assump- 
tion  is  difficult to reconcile with the  observed fact that  U.S.  senators  from the 
same state possess substantially different voting records (Higgs,  1989, Jung et al., 
1994).  The characteristics of the entire constituency seem to be too general to be 
an adequate approximation of the  specific part of the constituency the congress- 
man tries to represent (cf. Noll,  1989). This point is  elaborated empirically by a 
number of authors who  all  emphasize the  importance of distinguishing  between 
the geographical and the (re)election constituency. 53  Although Poole and Romer 
(1993) agree with this distinction, they notify that there is a danger of "running 
into a  tautology if we  say that,  by definition, a  legislator is  serving his election 
constituency". Such an approach puts too much emphasis on elections as means of 
51 The extent to which the legislator might shirk, by not voting in accordance with the preferences of 
the constituency, is also related  to the specific characteristics of the institution under consideration. 
Some evidence for this is found by Richardson and Munger (1990),  Their results indicate that House 
members closely  serve the relevant constituency, whereas  senators follow  more  strongly their own 
judgement. Zupan (1989) finds evidence to the contrary, though. 
52 A number of authors for instance, emphasis the impact of constituency preferences on the supply 
price  of legislator's services and hence on interest groups'  strategies (Endersby and Munger,  1992, 
Grier and Munger, 1986,  1991, Stratmann,  1992a,1994). 
53 Studies that  are  particular  focused on  this point  are,  among others,  Bender (1994),  Fort  et  al. 
(1993),  Goff and Grier (1993), Jung et al. (1994),  Krehbiel (1993),  Peltzman (1984),  Richardson and 
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influencing public  policy and is  likely to underestimate the  influence of special 
interest groups. 54 As argued, the pattern of constituents' preference representation 
is important for the relative influence of interest groups on the political process. 
An important question to answer is, thus, whether there is  "a theoretically correct, 
operationally possible  method of measuring  constituent interest"  (Grier,  1993). 
Only when this problem is satisfactorily addressed the extent to which legislators 
shirk at the constituents' expense by giving in to demand of special interest groups 
can be answered. 
The same problem harasses another strand of literature that tries to assess  the 
extent to which legislators shirk by pursuing their personal goals (others than just 
reelection), especially by pushing their own ideology (i.e. their intrinsic valuation 
of  policy  outcomes). 55  This  literature  is  also  of  importance  for  the  relative 
influence of interest  groups.  When  a  legislator's  personal  goals  are  one  of the 
principle determinants of public  policy, the  relative influence of special interest 
groups  may  be  smaller. 56  On  the  other  hand,  when  there  is  (no)  room  for 
legislators  to  shirk  by  pursuing  their  own  goals,  there  is  also  (no)  room  for 
legislators to give in to the demand of special interest groups. From this broader 
perspective, the ideology literature and the literature on interest group influence 
are connected (cf. Bronars and Lott,  1994). 
For the  (relative) influence of interest  groups  two  interrelated issues,  exten- 
sively debated  in  the  ideology literature,  are  of interest.  The  first concerns the 
54 The introduction of the reelection constituency also blurs the distinction between constituents and 
interest  groups.  Some  authors  distinguish special  interest  groups  from  the  reelection  constituency, 
others incorporate these groups into a  legislator's constituency. For example, Kau and Rubin (1993) 
view voting in response to contributions from special moneyed interests as shirking at the constituents' 
expense, whereas Fort et al. (1993) take PACs as part of a legislator's constituency. 
55 Legislator's pursuit of own goals other than ideology are only rarely considered. Exceptions are 
Chappell  (1981b),  who  finds  that  personal  financial  holdings  of  congressmen are  unimportant  in 
determining  policy  decisions,  and  Bender  (1988,  1991),  who  reports  that  the  implied  change  in 
reelection probability does affect a legislator's vote on campaign finance reform legislation. Relatedly, 
Thorbecke and Matzelevich (1995) find that representatives who manage their personal finances badly 
tend  to  vote  in  a  fiscally  irresponsible  manner,  and  they  take  this  as  evidence  for  nonideological 
shirking by legislators. Other empirical studies treat groups of legislators as interest groups in their own 
right.  Abrams and Settle  (1978),  lbr  instance, find  that  Democrats  vote  significantly different from 
Republicans on public financing of presidential elections, legislation which would be beneficial to the 
Democratic party. Lindsay and Maloney (1988) envisage political parties as cartels on the supply side 
of legislation (to obtain a higher price from interest groups), and they report some empirical evidence 
consistent with this view.  Others treat  all  incumbent politicians as an interest group and investigate 
whether incumbents try to restrict entry from new entrants  either by reducing competition between 
them through geographical segmentation of the political market (Crain, 1977),  or by adopting campaign 
spending regulation detrimental to  challengers (Palda,  1994,  Palda  and Palda,  1985,  1994)  -,  try to 
obtain higher wages (McCormick and Tollison,  1978) or, third, try to regulate lobbyists in such a way 
as to benefit those in the legislature (Brinig et al.,  1993). 
56 The influence of interest groups may also become larger in this case, for instance when legislators 
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measurement of a  legislator's ideology and its influence on his  voting behavior. 
Many studies measure a legislator's ideology through interest group ratings based 
on a bundle of past votes, and a number of them find a  significant impact. But, 
since  observed  voting  behavior  is  not  guided  solely  by  the  legislator's  own 
ideology,  the  interest  group  ratings  also  represent  constituents'  (and  interest 
groups') interests. Peltzman (1984) even argues that these ideology variables just 
serve as  useful proxies for the  economic characteristics of the (re)election con- 
stituency.  A  number of studies  recognize the  inadequacy  of the  interest  group 
ratings  and employ a  residualization technique to purify the  purported ideology 
indicator  from  constituents'  interests.  In  a  second  step,  the  influence  of  this 
residual measure  is  determined and usually found to be  significant (e.g.  Carson 
and Oppenheimer, 1984). However, this methodology has raised a lot of criticism 
as well. 57 
The secofid issue of interest involves the interpretation of ideologically based 
voting. Some authors, guided by the results indicating that the degree of ideologi- 
cally based voting is inversely related to the constituents' slack in control and the 
legislator's  political  opportunity  costs, 58  interpret  it  as  legislator's  shirking. 
Contrarily, others argue that ideologically based voting provides a mechanism by 
which shirking is controlled. This interpretation rests on the idea that the political 
market  naturally  selects  legislators  over  time  (Lott,  1987a;  Lott  and  Reed, 
1989).  59  Legislators  signal  with  their past  voting  behavior that  they  are  ideo- 
logues,  and  true  ideologues  can  provide  this  signal  at  a  much  lower  cost. 
Competition between  legislators,  then,  will  efficiently sort the  political  market. 
Some evidence suggest that legislators do not alter their voting behavior in their 
last term, supporting the sorting model, and sorting to operate very effectively. 60 
The ideological sorting model is incompatible with a  strong influence of special 
interest groups at the constituent's expense (cf. Bronars and Lott,  1994). 
57 See Bender (1994), Jackson and Kingdon (1992), Lott and Davis (1992), and Segal et al. (1992).  In 
particular, by employing the two stage procedure the impact of ideology is likely to be overstated and, 
thus, the impact of other factors (interest groups) is likely to be underestimated. 
58 Some studies obtain this result by considering cost differences among several issues (e.g. Nelson 
and Silverberg, 1987,  Peltzman, 1984),  other studies focus on differences in opportunity costs among 
legislators typically caused by reelection considerations (e.g.  Bender,  1991,  Davis and Porter,  1989, 
Kalt and Zupan,  1984,  1990,  McArthur and Marks,  1988, Tosini and Tower, 1987). 
59 An alternative explanation to justify the second interpretation entails that ideology may serve as a 
cheap  summary  indicator to  provide the constituents with  information about  the  legislator's policy 
position (Peltzman,  1984).  Dougan and Munger (1989)  provide some empirical evidence for incum- 
bents having an incentive to invest in brand name capital by maintaining a consistent voting record, but 
see Lott and Davis (1992) for a critique. 
6o See Lott (1987a),  Lott and Bronars (1993),  Poole and Romer (1993) and Van Beek (1991),  and, 
Kau and Rubin (1993), Lott and Davis (1992),  and Wright (1993), respectively. Although other studies 
claim to find some evidence that legislators do alter their voting behavior in their last term, they still 
argue that sorting takes place (Carey,  1994,  Zupan,  1990).  Besides, the evidence provided by Zupan 
(1990) for legislators' altering behavior in the last term is strongly criticized by Van Beek (1991). 43(I  J. Potters. R. Sloof  / European Journal of Political Economy 12 (1996) 403-442 
The  discussion  above  makes  clear  that  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  order  the 
several  determinants  of public  policy  according  to  their  relative  importance.  It 
seems almost impossible to infer whether voters (the public at large), politicians or 
special interest  groups are the most influential.  An assessment  of interest  groups' 
relative  influence  becomes  even  more  difficult  when  one  acknowledges  the 
possibilities  of cooperation between  agents  in the political system. The possibility 
of vote trading (logrolling) among legislators  may obscure the actual influence of 
interest groups. 61  Likewise,  interest  groups may cooperate at certain instances in 
order to increase their influence, and the pattern of cooperation may depend on the 
issues  involved. 62  A  final  complication  is  that  interest  groups  may  direct  their 
activities  at  the  constituents  in  trying  to  influence  public  policy  indirectly.  For 
instance, Schneider and Naumann (1982) find that the recommendations of interest 
groups sometimes had a  significant influence on voters in Swiss referenda.  63 
Public policy is the outcome of a complicated process with several actors who 
all influence the final  outcome, either directly or indirectly.  The influence of one 
specific  group  of  actors,  i.c.  interest  groups,  depends  on  these  complicated 
processes  and  the  influence  of  other  actors.  Often,  empirical  results  can  be 
interpreted in several ways and explained by different factors. This is illustrated by 
the frequent statement in the formulation of hypotheses that the sign of a particular 
coefficient can be positive or negative for different reasons.  In order to avoid this 
multiciplicity of possible interpretations,  competing hypotheses should be derived 
from underlying theoretical  models. Theory can guide the analysis  by structuring 
the  search  for  new  empirical  material  and  providing  a  base  for  coherence  and 
embeddedness.  This  may not be easy, as sometimes such theory is (still)  lacking. 
3.3.  Data problems 
As  with  any  empirical  inquiry,  lack  of data  constrains  the  assessment  of the 
influence of interest  groups on public policy in important ways. Two interrelated 
problems,  in particular,  are worthy of some consideration.  The first relates  to the 
frequent  use  of proxies  for the  relevant  but  unobservable  quantities.  The  second 
problem  concerns  the  limited  scope  of  the  empirical  analyses  and,  hence,  the 
question of generalizability. 
A  typical, and often the only possible,  solution to the lack of data is the use of 
instrumental  variables as proxies for the unknown quantity. Unfortunately, the use 
of proxies  often  leads  to  problems  of interpretation.  This  was  already  clear  in 
Section  2.2  where  we surveyed the empirical  results  of studies  that used  proxies 
for  the  activities  of interest  groups.  As  argued,  these  proxies  are  related  to  the 
6I See Kau and Rubin (1978, 1979b), and Stratmann (1991, 1992b). 
62 See, e.g., Masters and Zardkoohi (1988), Salisbury et al. (1987). 
63 Lupia (1994) and Rapoport et al. (1991) also find that interest group endorsements may affect 
voters. J. Potters, R. Sloof  / European Journal of Political Economy 12 (1996) 403-442  431 
group's stake, the free-rider problem of collective action and the political success 
of  the  group.  Usually,  a  proxy  incorporates  more  than  one  of  these  aspects. 
Examples given in  the  previous  section concern,  among  others,  the  number  and 
dispersion of potential participants  which  both  represent  free-riding effects  and 
political  strength.  Just  to  give  another  example,  consider  a  legislator's  party 
affiliation. Some view party affiliation as a  measure of constituency preferences, 
some as a  measure of a  candidate's ideology, some as a  measure of a  legislator's 
stand used to identify a  group's political friends,  and others  as an  indicator of a 
candidate's  power  (membership  of  the  majority  party).  Due  to  the  latter  two 
interpretations,  for  instance,  the  fact  that  labor groups  mainly donate  to  Demo- 
cratic  representatives  may  be  taken  as  evidence  for  both  the  support  and  the 
exchange model. 64 
To  find  satisfactory and  unambiguous  proxies is  a  difficult task.  Sometimes, 
creativity  and  the  use  of  supplementary  information  from  various  sources  can 
alleviate the problem. For example, when assessing the strategy of interest groups, 
we  in  fact  need  information  on  a  politician's  stand  before  the  interest  group 
became active. Austen-Smith and Wright (1994)  make use of a  headcount by the 
American  Conservative  Union  prior  to  the  1987  confirmation  vote  on  Bork's 
nomination,  to  assess  the  expected  vote  of  senators  before  the  onset  of  any 
lobbying.  In  addition,  they  use  data  collected  by  Caldeira  and  Wright  (1989) 
through direct mail and personal interviewing, to get information on the positions 
of  some  468  organizations  and  their  lobbying  efforts.  Also  experimental  tech- 
niques can provide useful information. For instance, Cover and Brumberg (1982) 
set  up  a  clever field experiment to  assess  the  impact of the  so-called  'franking 
privilege' on  incumbents'  popularity lead over challengers prior to any campaign 
expenditures. 65 
A  second,  and  probably  more  severe  problem,  is  that  the  empirical  studies 
surveyed have a rather restricted scope in a number of respects. Firstly, partly as a 
consequence of the convenient possibility of interstate comparison, most empirical 
studies  are  directed to  the  American  situation.  Relatively few  empirical  results 
exist for the influence of interest groups on public policy for countries outside the 
United States. 66  Consequently, the empirical studies are biased towards a particu- 
64 The recent (november 1994) electoral landslide in the U.S., giving Republicans a majority in the 
House, yields a fresh opportunity to test whether labor groups use a support (only Democrats) or an 
exchange (Democrats and Republicans) strategy. 
65 Even laboratory experiments can be a useful source of additional information. For example, Potters 
(1992) provides experimental evidence that lobbying is more likely to be addressed to  'marginal' 
targets who just need a small additional push, 
66 Some exceptions are Naert (1990) for Belgium, Guttman (1980) and Kamath (1989) for India, 
Zusman (1976) and Zusman and Amiad (1977) for Israel, Renaud and Van Winden (1988, 1991), and 
Van Velthoven and Van Winden (1986) for the Netherlands, Schneider and Naumann (1982) and 
Kischgassner and Pommerehne (1988) for Switzerland, and Beghin and Kherallah (1994), Globerman 
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lar political system and it is questionable whether the results can be generalized to 
other countries. 67  Secondly, with respect to the activities by interest groups there 
is a strong concentration on campaign contributions, leading to a bias towards one 
specific means of influence. A  priori there is no reason to assume this activity to 
be representative for other channels of influence, or for the interest group's total 
package of instruments (cf. Grenzke, 1989a). As discussed in the previous section, 
there is some preliminary evidence that the impact of activities like lobbying are 
not unlikely to  have  a  stronger effect  (on  legislators).  Similarly, there  is  some 
tentative evidence for interest groups'  contributing strategies to differ from their 
lobbying strategies, and for some interaction (complementarity) between these two 
means of influence. Thirdly, the analysis of the impact of interest group actions is 
largely  concentrated on  legislative  voting.  However,  also  non-voting activities, 
like  making  up  the  details  of  bills,  lobbying among  fellow  congressmen  and 
handing in amendments, are crucial in determining legislative outcomes.  Schloz- 
man  and  Tierney  (1986)  even  argue  that  frequently  a  legislator's  non-voting 
activities are at odds with the direction of her or his vote on the floor. 68  Fourthly, 
most empirical studies are concerned with narrow policy areas.  Only the success 
or  failure  of  an  interest  group  in  influencing policy  in  one  particular  area  is 
evaluated, but an interest group may well try to affect policy concerning a variety 
of issues.  Fifthly, there  are  hardly  any studies  that  deal  with  targets  of interest 
group activity other than legislators. 69 Of course, the studies reviewed in Section 
2.2  relate  interest  group  characteristics  to  general  policy  outcomes,  but  these 
studies do not give information on how influence on policy outcomes is effectu- 
ated.  Empirical material, for instance, on the  direct interactions between interest 
groups and members of the executive branch is almost completely lacking (for an 
exception see Boucher (1991)). 70  Finally, though many argue that dynamics are 
important,  most  studies  investigate the  influence of  interest  groups  in  a  static 
framework.  Interest  groups  and  the  polity  interact  repeatedly  and  notions  like 
~7 Some evidence  that political institutions  matter for the influence  of interest groups is provided by 
Beghin and Kherallah  (1994). In their cross-country  analysis they distinguish  four political systems - 
multi-party (pluralism), dominant  party, one party and no party systems, respectively -  and find that 
the level of agricultural protection is highest for dominant  party systems. Further democratization  to a 
complete pluralistic  system does not increase agricultural  assistance. 
68 Uri and Mixon (1980) raise a similar point. They observe that legislators vote differently on 
amendments to the 1977 minimum wage bill as compared to their voting behavior on the final vote. 
They argue that by voting differently  on amendments,  the legislator  can appeal to several subgroups  of 
his constituency  simultaneously. 
69 However, for an excellent  analysis  of the impact  of organized interests on the U.S. Supreme Court, 
see Caldeira and Wright (1988). 
70 On the other hand, quite a number  of studies try to assess the political  influence  of the bureaucrats 
as an interest group in itself, see e.g. Dilorenzo  (1981), Meier (1987), Neck and Schneider  (1988) and 
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reputation and credibility matter in developing and maintaining long term relation- 
ships. 71 
Perhaps,  the largest progress in the study of interest group influence could be 
made by broadening the scope of systematic empirical inquiry. 
4.  Conclusion 
It  is  generally  believed  that  interest  groups  carry  much  weight  with  the 
determination  of public  policy.  The  empirical results  reviewed and  discussed  in 
Section  2  provide  us  with  more  tangible  evidence  for the  influence  of interest 
groups  on  policy  outcomes.  Even  though  on  a  number  of  accounts  equivocal 
results are obtained, it seems justified to present the following 'stylized facts' (cf. 
the summary given in Section 2.3): 
1.  Campaign  contributions  and  lobbying  alter  a  legislator's  (voting)  behavior, 
particularly, with respect to bills with a narrow focus and low public visibility. 
2.  The strategy of ideological groups is oriented towards supporting like-minded 
legislators;  corporate  groups are  more aimed to change  legislators'  positions; 
labor groups employ an intermediate strategy. 
3.  The  larger  the  organized  membership  of  an  interest  group,  the  larger  its 
political influence will be. 
4.  A  group's stake in influencing public policy is a positive determinant of both 
its political activity and its success. 
5.  The relation between the number of potential participants  of collective action 
and influence on policy outcomes is an intricate one, driven by both free-riding 
effects  and  effects  on  the  group's  (electoral)  resources.  The  same  holds  for 
measures of concentration. 
6.  The presence of an oppositional (coalitional) force in the political arena hurts 
(helps) a group's case in politics. 
7.  Strong  electoral  pressures  on  the  polity and  the  presence  of a  well-informed 
electorate, lower the influence of special interest groups. 
Furthermore,  our  discussion  -  given  in  Section  3  -  demonstrates  that  it  is 
important  to  recognize  the  simultaneous  and  mutual  relations  between  interest 
groups, legislators and voters, and to employ appropriate estimation techniques to 
account  for this  interdependence.  Also,  empirical  analysis  should  preferably be 
guided  by theoretical  models to  allow for the  derivation of clearcut hypotheses, 
unambiguous interpretation and a base for embeddedness. Fortunately, an increas- 
ing  appreciation  of  this  is  displayed  in  the  more  recent  contributions  to  the 
literature. 
71 Snyder (1992) incorporates dynamic aspects when investigating interest groups' contributing 
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A  subject of inquiry which is still awaiting progress, is the assessment of the 
influence  of interest  groups  relative to  the  influence of other factors,  like  the 
interests  of  voters  and  policy-makers.  As  of  yet,  conceptual  and  theoretical 
problems have hindered such an assessment. Finally, we believe that the empirical 
literature  could  benefit  greatly  by  broadening  its  database,  to  include  more 
countries, a larger variety in the means of influence employed by interest groups, 
and to account for the dynamic aspects in the relationship between interest groups 
and the polity. 
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